Digitization has transformed how users find and use copyrighted goods, but many existing legal options remain difficult to access, possibly leading to infringement. In a field experiment, we contact firms that are caught infringing on expensive digital images. Emails to all firms include a link to the licensing page of the infringed image; for treated firms, we add links to a significantly cheaper licensing option. Making infringers aware of the cheaper option leads to a fourteen-fold increase in the ex-post licensing rate, albeit from an extremely low baseline for the control firms. Two additional experimental interventions, designed to reduce search costs for (i) price and (ii) product information, also have large positive effects. Our results suggest that ex-post monetization (e.g., licensing after use) may expand the market, and that rights holders can create value by minimizing search and transactions costs.
Introduction
Digitization and its enabled distribution and social technologies have transformed how users find and use copyrighted goods. Use has expanded, and at the same time, sources of potential revenue for creators have become more fragmented. As a participant in the music industry observed, "These days it's essential to collect every income stream one can." 1 Indeed, even established creators may not be able to rely on a small number of high-value transactions; small-value and widely dispersed usage, collectively, can comprise a substantial portion of revenue. As a result, a key challenge that rights holders face in many creative industries is to develop 'digital-age' technological and logistical infrastructures, as well as suitable licensing models, that can track a large and dispersed quantity of usage and enable efficient flows of small streams of money.
Unfortunately, many existing legal options for licensing content remain difficult for users to access. 2 In contrast, many general-use search engines and social media make it easy for users to search for digital content or encounter it serendipitously, possibly leading to use that infringes on copyright. When this happens, infringement may provide potential marketing opportunities, as consumers' use of this content may be informative about their overall demand and their unobserved preferences for specific products.
The industry dynamics described above suggest the possibility of an 'ex-post monetization' approach by private parties. For example, rights holders may approach infringing users to (i) clarify their legal obligations; (ii) if applicable, increase their awareness of more-suitable purchasing options; and (iii) mitigate their search and transactions costs. 3 An ex-post market generates value by relaxing the requirement of obtaining permission prior to use and allowing consumers to find products in the manner that is the most convenient for them (Gans (2015) ; Menell (2016) ). 4 Its 1 Mark Beaven, in "Going to the Ends of the Earth to Get the Most Out of Music," June 8, 2015, New York Times. 2 There are often more frictions in markets to license content for commercial use than there are in markets for end consumption. For example, while a large share of end consumption of music may be well managed by platforms such as iTunes and Spotify, rights for commercial use or follow-on production are notoriously fragmented. Recently, the fitness technology company Peloton was sued for $150 million by several publishers for failing to license their music. https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/20/peloton-hit-with-150-million-music-licensing-suit/ 3 The approach we propose is qualitatively different from strategies that aim to maximize enforcement revenues by exploiting a legal threat. See Scott Morton and Shapiro (2014) for enforcement strategies and the notion of reasonable royalties for patents. 4 The idea that transactions costs are mitigated by allowing follow-on products to be created without obtaining permission from right holders is a key argument for establishing an alternative copyright regime. Gans (2015) provides the first theoretical framework on the impacts of different remix-broadly defined as derivative works created by combining or editing existing materials-rights regimes on the incentives to create not just follow-on, but also original, content. Menell (2016) makes a legal case for a remix compulsory licensing regime. development may become a meaningful way to monetize copyright and to complement the ex-ante market. Naturally, from a copyright holder's perspective, the value of ex-post monetization is likely to depend on a number of factors, such as the extent of frictions preventing ex-ante legal consumption; rights-holders' abilities to capture value ex-post (either through direct or indirect methods); and the cost of monitoring infringing use.
Our paper explores the feasibility of an ex-post licensing approach in a specific setting: the stockphotography (pre-shot images) industry. 5 On behalf of photographers, stock-photo agencies license images to business customers. The industry is divided into premium and micro-stock segments, and there are two types of licensing models: (i) a 'rights managed' (RM) license restricts the use of an image within a pre-specified scope, including duration, purpose, and placement; and (ii) a 'royalty free' (RF) license allows the licensee to use the image without restrictions for a one-time payment. The highest-quality images in the premium segment are licensed through a RM model. This type of product targets usage occasions such as large advertising campaigns, and the price of a license is usually in the hundreds or even thousands of dollars. Remaining premium images are licensed through a RF model at prices of tens to hundreds of dollars for unrestricted use. All images in the micro-stock segment are licensed through a RF model. For small firms that want to display images on their websites, for example, the micro-stock segment tends to be the suitable option because of both its low price (tens of dollars or less) and lack of restrictions on use. Over the past decade or so, the stock-photography industry has experienced the trends described above:
(i) increasing expansion of image use (both legal and illegal); and (ii) a sharp decline in the share of revenue that comes from high-value transactions. 6 The data used in this paper are generated from a new field experiment conducted by one of the leading stock-image agencies (hereafter, the 'Agency') that offers products in both the premium and micro-stock segments through separate websites. The Agency monitored unauthorized use of its RM premium images-the most expensive images, representing a small percentage of its total 5 Glückler and Panitz (2013) estimates that the global revenue of the stock-photography industry was $2.88B in 2011. In comparison, the revenues of ASCAP and BMI, the two largest performance rights organizations that collect royalties on behalf of copyright holders in the music industry for public use of their works, were $1B each in 2012.
6 For a leading agency in this industry, for example, RM premium images-which represent a very small proportion of its portfolio in terms of quantity-used to account for about 40 percent of its total revenues 15 years ago. As of 2018, the revenue share of this type of product dropped to ten percent. Multiple factors may account for these changes, including increasing competition from low-cost providers that focus on the micro-stock segment and changing advertiser behaviors (for example, moving away from traditional channels such as billboard displays towards digital advertising).
portfolio-by commercial websites. In related work using evidence from a different field experiment, Luo and Mortimer (2017) show that many incidences of infringement appear to be 'uninformed,' in the sense that users lack awareness of their licensing options or obligations, or because third parties (e.g., web designers) infringed on their behalf.
The field experiment we analyze in this paper focuses on infringement cases involving the smallest firms, for which the infringed RM premium (hereafter, premium) image is unlikely to be a suitable product. 7 The Agency's goal was to encourage infringing users to purchase a legitimate image license by, first, increasing their awareness of the significantly cheaper micro-stock website (also owned by the Agency) and, second, lowering search costs for relevant product and price information. Specifically, the experiment includes two control and four treatment groups. Emails to all the treatment groups offered a micro-stock licensing option in addition to the option of licensing the infringed premium image. In contrast, emails to the control groups included only the premium licensing option. We further varied the treatment conditions in two dimensions: (a) emails to two treatment groups recommend four images from the micro-stock site that are similar to the infringed image, whereas emails to the other two treatment groups contain only a link to the home page of the micro-stock site; and (b) emails to two treatment groups and one control group add the price information of the infringed premium image, thus making the price comparison between the two options immediately clear. (The micro-stock price is available in the emails to all treatment groups.)
We find that awareness of the micro-stock option leads to a fourteen-fold increase in the probability of licensing, albeit from an extremely low baseline for the control groups. The treatment groups' average licensing rate, 2.63 percent of opened emails, consists almost entirely of licenses of the micro-stock option, and is several times higher than the most effective email marketing campaigns conducted by the Agency for the same type of products. This result is consistent with the idea that infringing use is informative of demand-at the basic level, the fact that these users are using images on their websites suggests that they may, on average, have a higher willingness to pay than a generic or even somewhat targeted group of non-customers.
In the treatment groups, both additional interventions have a large, positive average effect: image recommendation increases the probability of licensing a micro-stock image by 45 percent, 7 These cases make up about 20 percent of all detected cases infringing on the Agency's RM premium images. and the price comparison information increases the micro-stock licensing rate by 31 percent. Data on whether users click onto either of the licensing sites suggest that both interventions are effective because they reduce the costs of finding a replacement image. However, the mechanisms and the types of users affected by the two interventions appear to be different: by reducing the cost of finding a replacement image directly, image recommendation induces marginal users (i.e., those with a relatively low willingness to pay) to start a search instead of choosing the outside option; however, providing premium price information may direct infra-marginal users (i.e., those with a relatively high willingness to pay) away from the unsuitable premium option faster, resulting in a lower cost for searching the cheaper site.
Our findings suggest that ex-post monetization may expand the market to include consumers who would not have been active in an ex-ante market, and that rights holders may create value in the ex-post market by minimizing search and transactions costs. Though designed for a specific setting, these results provide evidence for the following features that may characterize copyright markets more generally: (i) users face search and informational frictions in the ex-ante market; (ii) infringing use can reveal information about consumer demand and preferences for specific products; and (iii) simplifying the search and transaction process is important for small-value transactions.
Admittedly, these results, alone, do not address the likely profitability of this approach, which will probably be context-dependent; and this paper does not consider some important questions, such as potential equilibrium responses by rights holders, or changes in the nature of competition.
Related literature
Our paper joins a small but growing set of studies in the piracy literature on proactive supplier responses that improve the availability and attractiveness of legal options (Danaher et al. (2010); Mortimer et al. (2012) ; Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018); de Matos et al. (forthcoming) ). In practice, the proactive use of infringement information by copyright holders to identify potential customers and to serve them better seems a qualitative change of mindset. Not long ago, infringement information was used primarily as a way to identify targets for lawsuits; to send take-down notices; to pursue settlement for past infringement without providing a path towards licensing for future use (Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) ; ; Reimers (2016) ; Luo and Mortimer (2017) ); or, more typically, it was not utilized at all. Our paper also relates to the sampling effect as it is understood in the literature-piracy may encourage users to experiment and discover products that are new to them (e.g., Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006b) ; Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007); Smith and Telang (2009); Gans (2012); Zhang (2016) ; Kretschmer and Peukert (2017) ). 8 Indeed, a novel aspect of our experimental design is its use of information about consumer preferences for specific products revealed by infringement to exogenously reduce user search costs.
Our results also contribute to the literature on information provision and search costs, in particular in the context of electronic marketplaces (Alba et al. (1997); Bakos (1997) ). Prior work focusing on competition has shown that lowering search costs for product characteristics may have different impacts on competition than lowering search costs for price information (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) ; Lynch and Ariely (2000)). Our paper shows that a firm's ability to simplify search for both price and product information across its full range of products may increase a user's expected payoff from consuming the firm's products relative to the outside option. Ultimately, both treatment interventions in our experiment appear to have facilitated the matching of users to their suitable products. From this perspective, our paper also relates to studies on the effect of information provision on the quality of matching (Anand and Shachar (2011) ; Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015) ) and the effects of reducing search costs on peer-to-peer platforms. (See Fradkin (2017) and Horton (forthcoming) on providing better-updated information about the availability of homes on Airbnb or of workers on oDesk.) Our paper also relates to the literature on recommender systems that help users to discover new products and to deal with information overload (Resnick and Varian (1997) ). While this literature (especially studies in computer science and information systems) focuses mainly on system designs, important economic considerations include the effects on the diversity of sales (Fleder and Hosanagar (2009) ); potential crowding-out effects on non-recommended products or workers (Horton (2017) ); and incentive mechanisms for the provision of evaluations (Avery et al. (1999) ). 9 Recommender systems have been applied to a wide range of settings, especially in the e-commerce, entertainment, and news industries. 10 Our paper provides a novel application of copyright manage-8 In the debate over whether piracy displaces or complements sales, prior studies generally find that piracy hurts sales on net (e.g., Rob and Waldfogel (2006) ; ; and see Waldfogel (2012) for a comprehensive survey).
9 See Adomavicius and Tuzhilin (2005) for a survey of the design of recommender systems, which are categorized into content-based systems that recommend items similar to those that a user liked in the past; collaborative filterbased systems that recommend what similar customers bought or liked; and hybrid methods.
10 See Lu et al. (2015) for a comprehensive review of the applications of recommender systems.
ment in which the information on user preference is revealed from illicit behaviors. Our paper also contributes new field-experimental evidence on the causal effect of a recommender system (Jannach and Hegelich (2009); Belluf et al. (2012) ; Sharma et al. (2015) ; Carmi et al. (2017) ), which is often challenging to identify because recommendations and consumer interest are expected to be correlated. Our results show that only ten percent of all recommended purchases would have happened without the recommender system. This result provides an interesting contrast to Sharma et al. (2015) who show that in the context of Amazon.com, at least 75 percent of recommendation click-throughs would have happened even without Amazon's recommender system. Emails to all the treatment groups add an affordable micro-stock licensing option (indicated by "Micro" in the second and the last rows), in addition to the premium option.
Experimental Design
We further vary the treatment conditions in two dimensions. First, emails to two treatment groups (second row) contain a link to the home page of the micro-stock site. In contrast, emails to the other two treatment groups (the last row, indicated by "Rec") recommend, based on the Agency's proprietary algorithm, four images from the micro-stock site that are similar to the infringed premium image. The emails contain a thumbnail and a link to the licensing page for each of the four recommended images. Second, emails to two treatment groups and one control group (indicated by "Price" in the second column) add the following premium price information:
"Licensing costs for online use of Rights Managed images typically range from $545 to $1140 for a 3-month period." The price information on a micro-stock image ("as low as $12 per image") is presented in the same way in the emails to all four treatment groups.
For illustration purposes, figure 1 presents the email template used for one of the treatment groups ("Micro + Rec"). The itemized portion in the middle is the only part that varies across groups. 11 Emails to the corresponding control group ("0") in the same column of not contain the third bullet point; that is, they include only a link that directs the user to the licensing page of the infringed premium image. Also in the same column of table 1, emails to the other treatment group that do not recommend images ("Micro") include the third bullet point but stop at "$12 per image." Finally, the templates used for groups given premium-image price information (i.e., the three groups in the second column of table 1) are exactly the same as their counterparts in the previous column, except that the premium-price information described in the previous paragraph is added to the end of the second bullet point.
Cases included in the experiment involve small businesses whose infringement (of premium images) was identified within the preceding two years. Cases were allocated across groups using a random-number generator. We intentionally allocated more cases to the two treatment groups for which similar images were recommended, as, ex-ante, the Agency deemed this to be the most constructive approach. We sent 24,090 emails in four batches between November 15 and December 04, 2017. 12
Analysis sample
To generate the analysis sample, we removed cases for which (1) the email was bounced back due to an invalid address (13 percent); and (2) the email was not opened in the first 14 days (65 percent of the valid emails). Appendix table A3 confirms that both likelihoods are statistically the same across groups. We focus on outcomes in the first 14 days to avoid the confounding effect that worse-performing groups in the initial two weeks would receive more intense follow-up, as only cases that had not yet licensed received follow-up emails after 14 days. Our data show that about 65 percent of licensing takes place within the first three days, and 79 percent takes place within the first 14 days. The final analysis sample consists of 7,407 cases. Table 2 shows that the groups are well-balanced with respect to basic case characteristics.
Overall, 12 percent of the cases involve the unauthorized use of multiple images represented by the Agency. For multi-image cases, the email displays only one of the images without mentioning that it is a multi-image case. Across all cases, 68 percent of the displayed images are high resolution, and 80 percent are displayed on a secondary page of the firm's website rather than on the home page.
The average age of the cases (the number of months between the date when the case was identified and the date when the email was sent) is 14.5 months. It is possible that the infringing images would no longer be on display at the time of our experiment, as some of the firms that responded to our emails pointed out. 13 The raw data show a small but marginally significant negative correlation between the age of a case and the likelihood of licensing, which is consistent with the idea that the older the case, the more likely that the images were no longer on display. 14 It is, thus, possible that the overall licensing rate would be higher if emails were sent in a more timely manner. The final column of table 2 reports the log of the number of total stock images on a website. This variable captures the number of unique images identified as stock images represented by several stock-photo agencies, including, but not restricted to, the Agency with whom we ran the experiment. These images could have been licensed through legal means or used without authorization. Though noisy, this variable is the only systematically available variable that may be a proxy for a firm's overall demand for images.
Results

Effects of awareness of the micro-stock licensing option
Column 1 of table 3 shows that the average 14-day licensing probability (including both the premium and micro-stock options) for all treatment groups is fourteen times that for the two control groups (2.63 versus 0.17 percent for opened emails, and p-value < 0.001). Almost all of the licenses are of the micro-stock option. Only seven licenses-three in the two control groups and four in the treatment groups-are of the premium option. These results show that the premium option is not suitable for almost all the firms in our sample. Hence, the baseline licensing rate in the control groups is extremely low, and awareness of an affordable option can significantly increase the licensing rate.
Column 2 of table 3 shows that the expected revenue per case for the treatment groups is 2.5
13 A small number of recipients sent their clarification questions, explanations for the incidences, or further inquiries to the contact email address provided in the emails. These emails received replies within a day or two, following a template that was concise and friendly in tone. Importantly, the reply emails to users were written so as not to interfere with different treatments; in particular, they made no recommendations of the more affordable licensing site or replacement images.
14 The correlation between the age of a case and the likelihood of licensing is -0.0218, and p-value is 0.0608.
times that for the control groups ($0.92 vs. $0.38). The estimated difference, though economically large, is statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.218). 15 In order to reliably distinguish the effect from zero, we need to increase the sample size substantially. If we assume that the impact-tostandard-deviation ratio is estimated correctly, 17,006 observations (2.3 times our current sample size), evenly split between control and treatment conditions is required for a test with a power of 80% at the 5% (one-sided) significance level (Lewis and Rao (2015) ). 16 Of course, because there are only four licenses from the control groups, the impact-to-standard-deviation ratio may not be estimated correctly.
These results also show a clear tradeoff between the probability of licensing and revenue per license, as the revenue per premium license is much higher than that for the micro-stock license ($423 vs. $23) . This is consistent with the idea that, in general, managers need to be mindful of the potential cannibalization effect of making cheaper options more available and easier to use. In our case, however, the Agency made it clear that maximizing static revenue over infringing use is not its objective; in other words, even if the expected revenue is not higher, the Agency may feel compelled to provide the cheaper option to help increase user engagement and generate potential monetization opportunities over future use in response to changes in the marketplace and competition.
Given that licensing of the premium option is extremely rare, the rest of our analysis focuses on licensing of micro-stock images by the four treatment groups. Specifically, we examine the effects of the two interventions: (i) image recommendations; and (ii) provision of the premium-image price information. We first report the licensing outcomes in section 3.2; then, in section 3.3, we examine whether and how users search the premium or micro-stock sites, which may shed light on potential mechanisms.
Before moving on to the specific effects of the two interventions, we want to highlight that the average licensing rate of the micro-stock images in the four treatment groups is several times higher than the rate in the Agency's most effective email marketing campaigns for micro-stock images. 17 This is consistent with the idea that infringing use is informative of demand. The = 0.038, where 14.03 is the pooled standard deviation from the (pooled) control groups and the (pooled) treatment groups.
17 This comparison has incorporated respective email-open rates and, hence, is conditional on all emails sent (not just on opened emails). For confidentiality, detailed statistics about the Agency's marketing campaigns are not disclosed. It is plausible that the relatively high licensing rate in our experiment is driven partly by an implicit threat, even though the emails are generally friendly by design.
fact that these users are using images on their websites suggests that they may, on average, have a higher willingness to pay than a generic or even somewhat targeted group of non-customers.
Furthermore, the ability to observe the specific product chosen by a given user seems important for effective recommendations, given the inherent difficulty in predicting consumer preference ex-ante (especially for creative products). Lastly, it is also important to make the distinction between preand post-infringement demand. The higher licensing rate in our context may be partly driven by the fact that these websites are, to some extent, "locked in" to a particular type of images, given other sunk investments made about the website design before the arrival of our emails. Table 4a reports the average effect of image recommendations on micro-stock licensing, pooling together the treatment groups that did and did not receive price information on the premium image. Column 1 shows that recommending images increases the likelihood of licensing by 45 percent, from 0.020 to 0.029 (p-value 0.058). Column 2 shows that the average revenue per case increases by 60 percent, from 0.366 to 0.586 (p-value 0.054). The increase in average revenue is driven solely by a higher probability of licensing, rather than by a change in revenue conditional on licensing, as the average revenue per license is about $20 across groups (column 3). Table 4b reports the average effect of providing price information on a premium image, pooling together the treatment groups that did and did not receive image recommendations. Column 1 shows that providing premium price information increases the licensing rate by 31 percent, from 0.022 to 0.029 (p-value 0.108), and revenue per case by 45 percent, from 0.422 to 0.611 (p-value 0.075). Similar to image recommendation, the increase in average revenue is driven solely by a higher probability of licensing.
Effects of the two interventions on licensing the micro-stock option
In table 5, we report the licensing probability and the expected revenue per case for each of the four treatment groups. The results show that for each of the two interventions, the effect is economically larger without the other intervention than otherwise. Even though the differences are not statistically significant, the relative magnitudes of the effects suggest that the two interventions are substitutes for each other. For example, the effect of image recommendations on the licensing rate is 1.1 percentage points (from 0.015 to 0.026, p-value is 0.078), or 73 percent, when users do not have the premium-price information. When users are already given the premium-price information, the effect of image recommendations becomes 0.6 percentage points (from 0.025 to 0.031, p-value is 0.317) or 24 percent. 18 As we discuss later in section 3.3, one potential explanation for this negative interaction effect is that the two interventions appear to influence the licensing outcomes through a similar mechanism-saving time and effort for the users to find a replacement image.
Thus, when one intervention is in place, the incremental effect of the other is likely to be smaller.
Appendix table A5 presents regression results, controlling for basic case characteristics and batch dummies. The estimated effects of the interventions and their statistical significance levels are consistent with the raw-data comparisons reported in the paper. The only control variable that is significantly related to licensing probabilities is log(Total stock images on site+1), a noisy proxy for a firm's demand for images; and, intuitively, the coefficient is positive. 19
Search and potential mechanisms
The above results show that, on average, both interventions have an economically large effect on licensing outcomes. To better understand potential mechanisms, in this section, we analyze whether a user conducts a search, using data on whether the user clicks the email links to either of the two licensing sites. Before presenting the results, we describe a conceptual model of user search choices that might help us interpret the data.
Consider a user in group "Micro" who is aware of both licensing options but is not offered either of the two interventions. For the premium option, the user knows which product to use (i.e., the image currently being used) but needs to learn the price. For the micro-stock option, the user knows the price level ("as low as $12") from the email but needs to search for a replacement image, the quality of which is uncertain. We assume that the user has three choices: (1) search for the price information on the premium site first, and, if the price is too high, decide whether or not to search for a replacement image on the micro-stock site; (2) go to the micro-stock site directly; or (3) take the outside option (which includes, for example, self-photography, piracy, and non-consumption). 20
To obtain either the price or quality information, the user needs to incur a search cost. Moreover, the marginal cost of additional search is potentially increasing (e.g., due to time constraints). Thus, relative to searching the micro-stock site directly, a downside of visiting the premium site first is that the user may face a higher search cost on the micro-stock site after spending time on the premium site.
Users may vary in their willingness to pay. With fairly intuitive specifications, one can show that the expected benefit of first searching the premium site is greater for users with a greater willingness to pay and that users follow a threshold rule: those with the highest willingness to pay visit the premium site first; those with the lowest willingness to pay take the outside option; and those in the middle search the micro-stock site directly. 21
In the following, we present the effects of the two interventions on the likelihood of searching both licensing sites. For simplicity, we focus on the average effects, pooling observations from both treatment groups for the other intervention. We discuss detailed break-outs as necessary.
Image recommendations
In the above conceptual model, image recommendations may affect the expected payoff from searching the micro-stock site through two mechanisms: (i) reducing the search cost for a replacement image; and (ii) reducing the uncertainty about image quality. The effect of lowering the search cost is straightforward-making the micro-stock option more attractive than the outside option should increase the likelihood that the user will browse the micro-stock site (with or without first visiting the premium site). The effect of revealing image quality, however, may vary: the likelihood of browsing the micro-stock site may increase if the user's prior belief about image quality is 20 In principle, the user may still visit the premium site after visiting the micro-stock site first. Theoretically, we can show that adding this possibility does not change the threshold result described below or the predictions of the model. Empirically, the data show that for users who searched both sites, 90 percent started with the premium site. This is intuitive because the premium option is listed before the micro-stock option in the email. Given that abstracting away from this possibility is not too concerning both empirically and theoretically (at least in the context of our current conceptual framework), for simplicity, we choose not to explicitly model it.
21 For group "Micro," we see some support for this statement: the mean of log(Total stock images on site+1), a noisy proxy for a firm's demand for images, is 1.68 for users who logged on to at least one of the two sites and 1.37 for users who did neither (p-value is 0.05).
sufficiently pessimistic, but not otherwise.
The data show that users who receive image recommendations are, on average, twice as likely as those without recommendations to search the micro-stock site (0.112 vs. 0.057, p-value < 0.001; column 2 of table 6a). Conditional on visiting the site, however, column 3 of the same table shows that users given recommendations are, on average, significantly less likely to license than users not given recommendations (0.253 vs. 0.350, p-value 0.05). These results are consistent with both (i) the idea that users face non-trivial search costs and that image recommendations reduce these costs; and (ii) the idea that users' prior belief about image quality is sufficiently pessimistic and that images recommendations correct this belief. Both effects are likely to attract marginal users (i.e., those with a relatively low willingness to pay) away from the outside option, resulting in a lower conditional licensing rate than that of their counterparts who do not receive recommendations but still decide to search.
Image recommendations, by increasing the option value of searching for a replacement image afterwards, may also increase the user's expected (standalone) payoff from first visiting the premium site. With constant marginal search costs, however, the increase in the value of searching the micro-stock site directly will be even larger: thus, a "cannibalization effect" is likely to result in a decrease in the likelihood of searching the premium site. A different possibility arises with increasing marginal search costs: having a specific replacement image to fall back on may make the user less concerned about subsequent search costs on the micro-stock site. If this effect is sufficiently strong, we may even observe an increase in the likelihood of visiting the premium site, especially for users not given the premium price information.
This is exactly what we find in the data: column 1 of table 6a shows that the users in our experiment are also more likely to search the premium site when they receive image recommendations than when they do not. The difference is 1.8 percentage points, or a 24-percent increase (p-value is 0.02). A further breakdown is also intuitive (see the second and third rows in table 7a): when the premium-image price information is not given, the difference in the probability of searching the premium site is 2.5 percentage points (p-value is 0.074), which is larger than the 1.1 percentage point difference when users are given the premium price information (p-value 0.169). These results are consistent with an increasing marginal search cost and the notion that image recommendations may mitigate the opportunity cost of learning the premium price first.
Finally, we find that, conditional on licensing, half of the images purchased by users who received recommendations are recommended images. In comparison, five percent of the users who do not receive recommendations, but who license an image found through independent search, ultimately license images that coincide with images generated by the same algorithm. This large difference (45 percentage points) confirms that image recommendations influence users' choices. This large difference also provides an interesting contrast to Sharma et al. (2015) , who find that in the case of Amazon, at least 75 percent of recommendation click-throughs would have happened even without Amazon's recommender system (in our experiment, this number is ten percent). 22
One potential explanation of the difference between the two results is that Amazon offers several additional sources of information about alternative products, such as reviews, that may lower the marginal value of product recommendation on a standalone basis.
Using a 'similarity' measure provided by the Agency, we find that, conditional on licensing, the average 'similarity' between the licensed image and the infringed image is statistically similar for users who did and did not receive image recommendations. This result is consistent with Horton (2017), who finds that a significant fraction of employers using oDesk, a large online labor market, follow algorithmic recommendations when extending offers to potential recruits, but that the workers recruited through recommendation are observationally similar to workers that employers would have recruited on their own in the absence of any algorithm recommendations. One potential explanation for this type of result is the selection effect discussed above; that is, users who license, or recruiters who make offers despite the absence of a recommendation, are likely to have a greater willingness to pay or a lower search cost. Another possible explanation is that there are potentially many images or workers that are close substitutes for each other; thus, algorithms may work mainly through providing convenience rather than superior match quality over independent search.
Provision of the premium-image price information
Conceptually, the effect of the premium-image price information on the probability of visiting the premium site depends on how the actual price compares to the users' prior beliefs. Column 1 of table 6b shows that, within the four treatment groups, the likelihood of searching the premium 22 The ten-percent number is derived from five percent (of licensed images by users not given recommendations coinciding with images generated by the algorithm) divided by 50 percent (of licensed images by users receiving recommendations being recommended images).
site after receiving the price information is less than one third the likelihood without receiving this information (0.042 versus 0.129, p-value < 0.001). The break-out results presented in table 7a
(that is, cross-column comparisons for each row), including the simple comparison between the two control groups, also show similar results. This suggests that the actual premium price is substantially higher (and more restrictive) than users expected, such that many users, given this information, no longer consider the possibility of purchasing the premium image.
Whether or not knowing the premium price affects users' likelihood of searching the microstock site is less obvious. This is because users who would have searched the premium site (in the absence of the price-information intervention) can continue to search the micro-stock site. In our conceptual model, if the marginal search cost is constant, the total likelihood of searching the micro-stock site should stay the same. However, if the marginal cost increases with additional search, we may observe more search on the micro-stock site by price-informed users because these users-without having to spend time discovering the premium price information-now face a lower cost for searching the micro-stock site.
Consistent with an increasing marginal search cost, column 2 of table 6b shows that providing premium price information increases the likelihood of visiting the micro-stock site by 18 percent (from 0.087 to 0.103, p-value 0.033). Unlike the case of image recommendations, we do not observe a lower likelihood of licensing conditional on searching the site (see column 3 of table 6b). This is consistent with the idea that those induced to search the micro-stock site after receiving the premium price information are likely to be infra-marginal users (i.e., those with relatively high willingness to pay), who would have searched for the premium price. Table 7b reports the probability of click-throughs to the micro-stock site for each of the four treatment groups. Similar to the results on licensing outcomes, the results show a smaller effect of one intervention when the other is in place. In particular, the effect of image recommendations is 7.2 percentage points (from 0.037 to 0.109), or 194 percent, for users not given the premiumprice information, whereas for users given the price information, the effect drops to four percentage points (from 0.076 to 0.116) or 52 percent. The effect of the premium-price information is 3.9 percentage points (from 0.037 to 0.076) or 105 percent for users not given image recommendations, but it mostly disappears for users given recommendations. This negative interaction is consistent with the discussion in this section-ultimately, both interventions seem to be valuable because they reduce the costs of finding a replacement micro-stock image. Thus, with search frictions already reduced by one intervention, the incremental effect of the other is smaller.
The above results in table 7b also show that when starting from the same baseline (without image recommendation or premium-price information; i.e., group "Micro"), the effect of image recommendation is economically larger than that of premium-price information (194 versus 105 percent). This is intuitive, as the former reduces the cost of finding a replacement image directly, whereas the latter reduces the cost only indirectly by guiding people to the more suitable option faster. However, as discussed before, because users affected by the two interventions are different-image recommendations seem to induce marginal users, while the price information induces infra-marginal users-the effect of the premium price information on the eventual licensing probability, 67 percent, is only slightly smaller than the 73-percent increase associated with image recommendations (see the same comparisons in table 5a starting from group "Micro").
Alternative explanations
Our conceptual model focuses on a reduction in search frictions. There might be alternative explanations for the effects of these interventions, and we briefly discuss some of them below.
First, the premium-price information may make the micro-stock option more attractive due to conventional "price effect" or behavioral effects (e.g., the cheaper option may sound like a good bargain with the knowledge of the large price contrast). Consider the comparison between the two treatment groups that are given image recommendations. For these two groups, the search frictions for replacement images are already low, and, thus, the friction-reduction channel of the premium-price information is relatively isolated. The results show that the extra effect of the premium-price information is very small and statistically insignificant for both the likelihood of browsing the micro-stock site and the licensing of micro-stock images. This suggests that these price effects, though plausible, may have limited standalone explanatory power in this particular context. Second, even though the general tone of the emails is friendly, the price information may increase the perceived likelihood that the Agency will escalate its enforcement because the price is higher than expected for most firms (Luo and Mortimer (2017) ). This may result in higher licensing rates.
We do not find supporting evidence for this conjecture in the longer-term outcome data that we collected for a random subsample of our sample firms. We find that, on average, groups given the price information are about as likely as groups not given this information to continue displaying the infringed premium image on their websites (0.127 versus 0.123, and p-value is 0.902). 23 Third, because clicking onto a site does not necessarily constitute a serious search, users may click only to see larger versions of the recommended images, and more email links may simply grab people's attention. These explanations may explain why groups with image recommendations click onto the micro-stock site more often and may also explain, to some extent, the lower licensing rate conditional on browsing. However, these explanations cannot explain why the overall licensing rate is significantly higher among users that receive image recommendations or why users tend to follow recommendations when licensing images.
Discussion
New distribution technologies expand the market for copyrighted goods by reaching more users, but also produce more fragmented sources of potential revenue. Many copyright holders find that it is no longer possible to rely on a small number of high-value transactions. Small-value and widely dispersed usage, collectively, can comprise a substantial portion of revenue. In this paper, we take a step towards understanding the implications of these dynamics by considering the possibility of ex-post licensing.
Effective implementation of any ex-post licensing approach is likely to be context-dependent.
In particular, it should depend on the costs of monitoring infringing use and the value created by having an ex-post market. When fixed costs of monitoring are high (e.g., the costs of developing and refining machine learning algorithms), scale will be important. Thus, developing monitoring technologies in-house may make sense only for the largest firms and platforms (such as YouTube and Facebook), or for industry-wide third-party providers. 24 Given the increasing importance of managing online use in general, some of these fixed investments may also be shared with the exante markets. When marginal costs are non-trivial, selective monitoring-such as monitoring only those assets that are most frequently purchased (and, hence, more likely to be infringed upon) or only infringers likely to have a high willingness to pay-may be more cost-effective than universal monitoring. In some circumstances, crowd-sourcing detection may tap into creators' incentives to protect their own products, or into the incentives of employees who may benefit from a sales lead.
Our experiment provides a feasibility test for this approach in a specific setting. Taken together, our findings provide evidence of the following features in the digital images market: (i) users may face search and informational frictions in the ex-ante licensing market, establishing the possibility for ex-post monetization to expand the market to include consumers who would not have been active in an ex-ante market; (ii) infringing use can reveal information about overall consumer demand and preferences for specific products; and (iii) simplifying the search and transaction process is important, especially for small-value transactions. These last two features affect rights holders' ability to capture value in the ex-post market by discovering demand and by minimizing search frictions and transactions costs. All three features characterize many copyright markets more generally. For example, music rights for follow-on productions are notoriously fragmented, creating significant search frictions; and infringing use reveals information about underlying demand conditions in many settings.
Rights holders should be expected to respond to the presence of an ex-post market in several ways. First, they may adjust pricing and search processes in the ex-ante market. Our experiment does not focus on this potential equilibrium response. Second, within the ex-post market, our paper shows that reducing search costs for replacement products can increase licensing. More typically, though, infringing users may be able to directly license the infringed product, which allows rights holders to focus on making payment systems easier or reducing transactions costs more generally.
Rights holders can also be creative in ways that motivate payment; for example, certain ways of framing payment requests may appeal to users' non-monetary motivations (Luo and Mortimer (2017) ). Apart from direct monetization, rights holders may also monetize indirectly-for example, through ad placement or complementary products.
Two conditions are taken as given in our setting, but may be important for fast ex-post resolution. First, infringement use can be precisely identified and is clear to all relevant parties. In other settings, ambiguity over whether infringement has occurred may add substantial frictions and deter fast resolution. While infringement is relatively clear for copyrighted goods based on visual examination and fingerprinting technologies using meta data, this is rarely true for patented tech-nologies, especially those involving software and business methods. Within copyright, use occasions that border on fair use may also lead to confusion. Second, rights holders' ability to commit to a pricing level or to a revenue-sharing regime that is generally considered 'fair' seems critical for removing costly ex-post negotiations, including hold-up, and for preventing static maximization of enforcement revenues from becoming the primary goal.
In light of the above discussion, we turn to two concrete examples of how the idea of ex-post monetization may generalize to other settings. We first consider infringing use of other products of the Agency. Recall that (i) the type of images that the Agency had been monitoring are rightsmanaged premium images that account for less than one percent of its total portfolio, with licenses that allow for only limited use; and (ii) our experimental sample includes only the smallest firms with the lowest willingness to pay. The volume of unauthorized use of the Agency's other productsmicro-stock images and royalty-free premium images (which cost between $50 and $500 but can be used without any restrictions)-is vastly greater and is expected to continue to increase, given the shrinking share of rights-managed premium licenses in this industry. 25 If one were to consider infringing use of these other products by a more representative sample of firms, our conjecture is that the likelihood of licensing and expected revenue would be substantially higher than the levels in our experiment. 26 Furthermore, in these cases, the user is much less likely to need to replace the image that it is currently using, due to the lower price points and the unrestricted licensing terms. This is likely to further increase the user's willingness to license, as it eliminates the costs associated with having to find a replacement image discussed in our conceptual model-(i) loss in fit to existing website design; (ii) direct search costs; and (ii) additional costs of taking down the existing image and replacing it with another.
Next, we consider an example outside of the digital images market, for which replacement is also not necessary. The example is YouTube's Content ID program, which automatically detects the infringing use of audio and visual reference files (contributed by rights holders) when user-generated videos are uploaded. Once infringing use is confirmed, YouTube applies one of three options, which 25 Results in Luo and Mortimer (2016) suggest that the greater the number of ex-ante licenses, the more likely it is that an image will show up in search results and, hence, be used without authorization.
26 This conjecture is based on an assumption that many infringing incidences on other product types are also not by price-sensitive infringers. This assumption seems reasonable, as conditional on uninformed infringers (i.e., users who do not have clear information about licensing options or obligations), their decision to infringe on a product appears to be largely a function of search costs (e.g., how likely a product is to show up in the search results) and the quality and fit of the image, rather than of price or licensing model of the image (Luo and Mortimer (2016, 2017) ).
is chosen ex-ante by rights holders: (i) block usage; (ii) track viewing statistics; or (iii) monetize through ad placement. As Gans (2015) points out, by allowing the use of content without having to first obtain permission from rights holders, and by committing rights holders to a pre-determined revenue-sharing regime, this program has the potential to reduce transactions costs that may deter the use of content in follow-on creations. 27 In light of the above discussion on costs and benefits of ex-post monetization, the YouTube Content ID program represents a best-use scenario in the sense that it has (i) the scale to spread fixed investments in detection, ad placement, and payment; and, importantly, (ii) products that are sufficiently attractive to advertisers. According to Google's recent updates, it has invested about $100m in the algorithm since 2007; rights holders choose to monetize in 90 percent of the cases and have collectively received about $3B in ad revenues. 28
Conclusion
In this study, we contacted infringing firms of expensive digital images and directed them toward a significantly cheaper, replacement product. We further designed two interventions to reduce search costs for replacement products and for the price comparison between the two products. We find that awareness of the cheaper option leads to a substantial increase in the licensing probability.
The licensing rate of the cheaper option by our treatment groups is several times greater than the most effective email marketing campaigns at the Agency for the same type of products. Both interventions that intend to reduce search frictions have a large positive effect on the probability of search and, eventually, licensing. Our results suggest that ex-post licensing may expand the market to include consumers who would not have been active in an ex-ante market, and that rights holders can create value in the ex-post market by minimizing search and transactions costs.
We conclude by cautioning that our results do not reflect potential equilibrium effects. In equilibrium, rights holders should respond to substitution between premium and cheaper offerings, as well as between the ex-ante market and the ex-post market via infringement. On the demand side, customers in the ex-ante market may substitute to the ex-post market if this makes them better off, given the relative prices and probability of detection. 29 Similarly, easier licensing options 27 Focusing on potential hold-up problems, Gans (2015) derives theoretical results on how regimes such as Content ID may affect investment incentives in both follow-on and original content.
28 "How Google Fights Piracy," by Google, November 2018, pages 24-27. 29 Canonical models of piracy (and crime in general) often model an agent's decision to undertake an illegal act for cheaper products may cannibalize sales of premium products, leading to price changes for both products. 30 Beyond any pricing responses, rights holders may also make premium products and the process of licensing them more attractive, and competitors may respond with pricing and product offerings. Theoretical and empirical research on the co-existence of ex-post and ex-ante markets and their equilibrium effects would be interesting and highly relevant for policy makers and managers.
as trading off the net payoff from taking this action and the expected legal risk, which consists of a probability of detection and a penalty (see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a) for a review of the theoretical piracy literature). Such models provide a starting point to think about potential equilibrium effects of the ex-ante market (legal consumption) and the ex-post market (payment after detection). In our framework, one may consider a model in which there are both informed users who follow the usual trade-offs and uninformed users whose decision to infringe is a function of the availability of content (e.g., how likely a product is to show up in Internet search results) and its quality and fit, rather than of price or potential risk upon detection. Different people may also face different search costs in the ex-ante market of finding the best-matched content for a given usage. 30 The extent and direction of price changes should depend on the distribution of users' willingness to pay, rights holders' ability to segment users, and the substitutability between products. For example, Frank and Salkever (1997) estimate that brand-name drug prices increased after generic entry, consistent with the idea that price-sensitive buyers shift to generics, leaving only price-insensitive buyers to purchase brand-name products. Notes: treatment group "Micro + Rec," with image recommendation but without premium-image price information. Under option 3, the email displays both a thumbnail and a link to the licensing page for each of the recommended images. Notes: the analysis sample. p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests between a given group and control group "0." Multi-image case indicates whether the case involves the unauthorized use of multiple images represented by the Agency; high resolution indicates whether the displayed image is high-resolution; secondary page equals one if the image is displayed on a secondary page of the firm's website rather than on the home page; case age is the number of months between the date when the case was identified and the date when the email was sent; and the number of total stock images on a website captures the number of unique images that are identified by a service provider as stock images represented by its client stock-photo agencies. Notes: 14-day licensing outcomes of the two control groups and the four treatment groups in the analysis sample. We pool the groups together to estimate the average effects of increasing the awareness of the micro-stock licensing option. License equals one if the user purchases either a premium or a micro-stock license, and revenue (in $) is the licensed revenue ($0 if there is no license). p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests. Notes: 14-day licensing outcomes of the micro-stock option for the four treatment groups in the analysis sample. We pool groups to estimate the average effect of each intervention. For example, 'without image recommendations' includes both "Micro" and "Micro + Price"; and 'with image recommendations' includes "Micro + Rec" and "Micro + Price + Rec." License equals one if the user purchases a micro-stock license, and revenue (in $) is the licensed revenue ($0 if there is no license). p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests. Notes: 14-day licensing outcomes of the micro-stock option for the four treatment groups in the analysis sample. (a) summarizes the licensing probability for each of the four treatment groups, and (b) the expected revenue per case, where revenue (in $) is replaced with $0 if there is no license. p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests. Notes: 14-day click-through rates onto the two licensing sites for the four treatment groups in the analysis sample. In (a) and (b), we pool groups to estimate the average effect of each intervention. Browse equals one if the user clicks through an email link to the respective licensing site, and license equals one if the user purchases a micro-stock license. p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests. Notes: 14-day click-through rates onto the two licensing sites. (a) presents the click-through rates onto the premium site for each of the six (control and treatment) groups; and (b) presents the click-through rates onto the micro-stock site by each of the four treatment groups. p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests. Notes: Includes all cases sent. As explained in detail in section B.3, we removed about four percent of the cases for the third and fourth batches because the Agency adjusted the tiering system of the firms during the experiment. As a result, some of the firms were no longer eligible for the experiment. The removed cases are statistically similar across different groups in their characteristics and proportional in quantity. Notes: Includes all cases sent. p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests between a given group and group "0" in the first row. Multi-image case indicates whether the case involves the unauthorized use of multiple images represented by the Agency; high resolution indicates whether the displayed image is high-resolution; secondary page equals one if the image is displayed on a secondary page of the firm's website rather than on the home page; case age is the number of months between the date when the case was identified and the date when the email was sent; and the number of total stock images on a website captures the number of unique images identified by a service provider as stock images represented by its client stock-photo agencies. Notes: We removed cases from our analysis for which (1) the email was bounced back due to an invalid address; and (2) the email was not opened in the first 14 days. p-values in parentheses are based on two-sided t-tests between a given group and control group "0" in the first row. Notes: 14-day click-through rates onto the licensing sites for the four treatment groups in the analysis sample. Browse equals one if the user clicks through an email link to the respective licensing site, and license equals one if the user purchases a micro-stock license. "With image recommendations" equals one if emails belong to treatment groups "Micro + Rec" or "Micro + Price + Rec;" and "with premium-image price info" equals one if in groups "Micro + Price" or "Micro + Price + Rec." Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Figure B1 . Template illustration-emails to group "0" Notes: control group, without premium-image price information. Figure B2 . Template illustration-emails to group "Micro" Notes: treatment group, without image recommendation or premium-image price information. Figure B3 . Template illustration-emails to group "Price" Notes: control group, with premium-image price information. Figure B4 . Template illustration-emails to group "Micro + Price"
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B. Further details of the experiment B.1 Email templates
Notes: treatment group, without image recommendation but with premium-image price information. Figure B5 . Template illustration-emails to group "Micro + Rec + Price"
Notes: treatment group, with both image recommendation and premium-image price information. Under option 3, the email displays both a thumbnail and a link to the licensing page for each of the recommended images.
B.2 Case eligibility
At the Agency, infringing firms are categorized into five 'tiers,' using a formula developed by a thirdparty data firm. The formula uses information about each infringing firm-such as annual revenues, number of employees, and industry-in order to predict the likelihood that the firm will settle an infringement claim at the list price of a premium image. Tier 1 is the most likely to settle and tier 5 the least likely. We do not observe the formula that maps a firm's observable characteristics to a particular tier, but firms with lower annual revenues (or if the revenue information is missing) tend to have a higher tier number. In a different experiment, Luo and Mortimer (2017) show that the likelihood of settlement increases significantly with a firm's annual revenue (or, equivalently, decreases significantly with the tier number).
As of January 2014, the Agency no longer requested any settlement amount from firms in tiers 4 and 5 but continued to pursue settlement from firms in lower tiers (larger firms). The new experiment that this paper analyzes included only firms in tiers 4 and 5 (that is, the smallest firms)
to avoid disrupting the normal operation of the compliance team at the Agency. The cases were identified within the two years preceding the experiment.
B.3 Allocation
The cases were allocated into the six groups in two steps. For about ten percent of the cases eligible for the experiment, the similar-image algorithm initially did not yield any results. To avoid confounding the effect of our interventions with the possibility that the user might not find similar replacement images on the website through their own searches, we excluded these cases at first.
All other cases were randomly allocated using a random-number generator to the six groups, as presented in table 1. Specifically, we allocated one tenth of the cases to each of the four groups (two control and two treatment groups) that do not receive image recommendations, and three tenths to each of the two treatment groups that received recommendations. We intentionally allocated more cases to the two treatment groups for which similar images are recommended, as the Agency deemed this to be the most constructive approach. It turned out later that the similar-image algorithm had not initially worked due to a technical glitch, which was not systematically correlated with the likely number of similar images on the licensing site or the characteristics of the case. In order to preserve as many observations as possible and to provide a more balanced number of observations across groups, we reinstated these cases and randomly added them equally to the four groups that were not given image recommendations. 31 We planned to send emails for 24,680 cases in four batches. The number of cases ranged from 726 to 728 per batch for the two control and two treatment groups without image recommendations, and from 1,630 to 1,631 per batch for the two treatment groups with image recommendations. As illustrated in table A1, the total number of emails that the Agency sent out was 24,090; thus, there is a discrepancy of 590 cases. 575 of these cases (98 percent) had been removed from the third and the fourth batches because the Agency changed its classification system for infringing firms in the middle of the experiment, which made about four percent of the cases ineligible for the experiment. We confirmed that the removed cases were statistically similar across different groups in their characteristics and were proportional in quantity. We were not able to trace the cause for the remaining 15 missing cases, and they appear to have come from different groups or batches without a systematic pattern. Table A2 shows that for cases that were eventually sent out, the groups were well-balanced.
B.4 Follow-up emails
A follow-up email was sent two weeks after the initial email, as long as there was no record of licensing events or email correspondence. The follow-up email was exactly the same as the initial email (that is, the interventions were consistent), except for the opening sentence, which indicated that it was a follow-up to the previous correspondence. There were no other consequences for continued infringement within the scope of this experiment.
31 It is important to note that the glitch was discovered before the emails were sent. Thus, these recipients received exactly the email template that they were supposed to according to the group assignment. In other words, it is not the case that these firms received the 'Rec' templates and that we grouped them into the other four groups only in the analysis.
C. Longer-term outcomes
To have a sense about users' non-licensing behaviors that we group together as the outside option in the paper (e.g., continual infringement or taking down the images with or without replacement), we collected longer-term outcomes in May 2019, about a year and a half after the start of our experiment.
We randomly selected 100 cases from each of the six groups (a total of 600 cases, about eight percent of our analysis sample) and manually collected the following variables: (i) whether the infringed image is still displayed on the page URL on which the infringement was first detected;
and (ii) whether we can find any image on the same page that looks similar (by visual examination) to the infringed premium image but is not licensed through the Agency. The second variable is meant to capture incidences in which the users replace with a similar image from outside sources.
However, this is, at best, a noisy measure for the following reasons. First, without knowing when the image files were coded into the webpages, we cannot tell whether they were already on display before our email interventions. Second, even if these images were placed on the webpages after our emails, we cannot tell whether they were used as a response to our emails or for unrelated reasons. Third, even though the first two reasons may over-estimate the replacement probability as a response to our emails, there are also reasons to believe that we may not capture the full extent of such behaviors-for example, if firms do not have to replace the infringed images with ones that look similar.
Another issue that we encounter during the data-collection process is that about 40 percent of pages are no longer valid. 32 Similar to our discussion above, some of these pages might already have been invalid before our emails, which is possible given that the average age of the case (from detection to our email) is 14.5 months. Those that were made invalid afterwards might have happened in response to our emails or for unrelated reasons. Panel (c) in table A7 presents the probability of invalid pages by group; pair-wise test statistics show that this probability does not differ across groups. 33 32 Recall that the majority of the pages are not the home page of a firm, so invalid pages do not mean that the firms are no longer in operation.
33 Because our experiment uses randomization (and the probability of invalid pages is similar across groups), we do not think that these invalid pages affect the interpretation of our licensing results in the paper. If anything, the possibility of invalid pages prior to our email interventions suggests that the licensing rate is likely to be higher if emails were sent out in a more timely manner.
In panels (a) and (b) of table A7, we present the probability of continual infringement and the probability of our measure of 'image replacement (from outside sources)' for all six groups, for all 600 cases. Overall, the rate of continual infringement is 12.5 percent; the rate of image replacement is 19.5 percent; and 28 percent took down the premium image without replacing it. 34
The differences across groups are not statistically significant, with the exception of the comparison between the two treatment groups that receive image recommendations but do or do not receive the premium price information. However, it is not clear why this might be the case. The data provide a noisy measure of the true underlying behavior, and the difference due to premium-price information in the other two comparisons is either zero (between the two treatment groups that do not receive image recommendations) or very small and insignificant (between the two control groups, p-value of 0.49).
Even though it is impossible to reach precise conclusions, these data do make us think further about the different outside options that users may choose. With all the data caveats in mind, here are some of our take-aways: First, the continual infringement rate (12.5 percent) is not trivial. These are likely to be cases in which the users perceive a low legal risk of continual infringement (which is not surprising given the generally non-threatening tone of the emails); and they also receive some value from keeping the particular image, as it might be an integral part of the website design, whereas the costs of finding a replacement image and integrating it into the site are relatively high. Thus, for these users, taking no action (i.e., continual infringement) may be the least costly option.
Second, for the 28 percent of cases in which the image is taken down without being replaced, the users likely face non-trivial costs of finding and uploading a replacement image and/or do not place much value on using an (or an additional) image.
Lastly, the incidence of using a replacement image from other sources is 19.5 percent. This suggests that for a sizable proportion of users, the additional costs of finding and uploading replacement images from outside sources are not prohibitively high and that they derive sufficient value from having an additional image on their websites. It is possible that these users are sufficiently price-sensitive to take their own photographs, or they may use Creative Commons images (such as from Flickr.com) for free. That said, given that the Agency's portfolio of micro-stock images is among the largest in the industry and that they cost only about $20-which does not seem like much for even a small business-this raises an interesting question: why don't these users simply license from the Agency, as offered in our emails? It is possible that they might not have been able to find a suitable replacement image on the Agency's site; or they may have reacted negatively to being monitored, particularly in the absence of an industry norm for ex-post licensing requests. Notes: a random subset of our analysis sample, with 100 cases from each group.
